Putinism: the ideology by Applebaum, Anne
ANNE APPLEBAUM
STRATEGIC UPDATE 13.2
FEBRUARY 2013
Philippe Roman Chair in History 
and International Affairs 2012-13 
LSE IDEAS 
PUTINISM: THE IDEOLOGY

1PUTINISM: THE IDEOLOGY 
Anne Applebaum holds the Philippe Roman Chair in History and International Affairs 
at LSE IDEAS, 2012-13.
Back during the Cold War, when the politics of the Kremlin were opaque, journalists 
and analysts often became obsessed with the personality of the leader of Russia, 
speculating about his taste in whiskey or suits, tracking his wife’s fashion sense or lack of 
it, hoping that would give them some clue about his policies. Times have changed, but 
the personality and beliefs of Vladimir Putin, the current Russian president, still matter 
just as much as those of his predecessors - if not more. In a state where authority is still 
vested in personalities, not in institutions, the Russian president’s vision of his country, 
his understanding of its history, his training as a KGB officer and his personal experience 
of life in the Soviet Union now have an incalculable impact on Russian political life. 
Indeed, the first clues to his character emerged early on, back when he was still prime 
minister, during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin. Soon after his appointment, Putin made 
a visit to the Lubyanka in Moscow. Once the headquarters of the KGB and its most 
notorious jail, the Lubyanka is now the home of the FSB, Russia’s internal security 
services, an institution which Putin himself directed before being asked to run the 
government. Putin visited the Lubyanka in 1999 on December 20th, a day still known 
and still celebrated in Russia as ‘Chekists Day’, the anniversary (that was the 82nd) of 
the founding of the Cheka, Lenin’s secret police. In that place and on that day, both so 
redolent of the bloodiest pages of Russian history, Putin solemnly unveiled a plaque in 
memory of Yuri Andropov. This was not an accidental gesture. Later, as president, Putin 
ordered another plaque placed on the Moscow building where Andropov had lived. 
He also erected a statue to him in a St. Petersburg suburb.
2For Putin, a man who pays extensive lip service to the theory of democratic elections, Andropov 
would seem an odd hero. Andropov was the longest serving director of the KGB, holding 
that office from 1967 until 1982, the year when he briefly became General Secretary of the 
Communist Party. Unlike some of his predecessors, Andropov was not just some faceless 
apparatchik: he had a very straightforward theory of governance. 
In Soviet terms, he was a moderniser - but not a democrat. On the contrary, having been 
the Russian ambassador to Budapest during the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, Andropov 
understood very precisely the danger which ‘democrats’ and other free-thinking and self-
organising groups posed to totalitarian regimes. Yet he also understood, like everyone else 
in the KGB, that the Soviet economy was lagging far behind that of the West. By time of his 
death, he came to the conclusion that ‘order and discipline’, as enforced by the methods 
of the KGB – the fight against alcoholism, laziness and corruption, coupled with the use of 
carefully targeted violence against dissidents, - would restore the sagging fortunes of the 
Soviet economy.
Vladimir Putin not only came of age in Andropov’s KGB, an organisation he first tried to join 
at the age of fifteen, but also shared some life experiences with the man who later became 
his hero. As ambassador to Budapest, Andropov had been shocked when young Hungarians 
first called for democracy, then protested against the communist establishment - and then 
took up arms against the regime and lynched several secret policemen. Putin had a similar 
experience in Dresden, in 1989, where he witnessed mass street protests and the ransacking 
of the headquarters of the Stasi, the East German secret police. German colleagues of his, he 
recalled years later, had suddenly lost their jobs and their privileges from one day to the next. 
It was shocking. 
Both men drew the same conclusion from these traumatic experiences: Talk of democracy 
leads to protest; protest leads to attacks on the Chekists. It is better to stop all talk of 
democracy before it goes any further. As a result, ‘order and discipline’ are nowadays words 
in Putin’s vocabulary too. 
This is not to say that Putin is Andropov, or that Putin wants to bring back the Soviet Union. 
But it does mean that Putin – and, more importantly, most of the people around him - is 
deeply steeped in the culture of Andropov’s KGB. What does this mean in practice? At the 
most fundamental level, he and the people around him deeply believe that the rulers of the 
state must exert careful control over the life of the nation. Events cannot be allowed just 
to happen, they must be controlled and manipulated. By the same token, markets cannot 
be genuinely open, elections cannot be unpredictable and the modern equivalent of the 
Soviet dissidents – the small groups of activists who oppose centralised Kremlin rule – must 
be carefully controlled through legal pressure, public propaganda and, if necessary, carefully 
targeted violence. 
3Just like their Soviet predecessors, Putin and the men around him also assume that 
anyone not supportive of their regime is by definition suspicious, and probably a foreign 
spy. At a rally as long ago as 2007, Putin declared: ‘Unfortunately, there are still those 
people in our country who act like jackals at foreign embassies…who count on the 
support of foreign friends and foreign governments but not on the support of their own 
people’. This was a direct warning to Russia’s few remaining human rights and trade 
union activists. It was also a comforting signal to Putin’s followers, who continue to 
believe, like Soviet secret policemen before them, that all important decisions should be 
made in Moscow by a small unelected group of people who know how to resist these 
foreign conspiracies. 
His concern about foreign influence has not faded during his years in power. On the 
contrary, on the night of his third and most recent re-election to the presidency last year, 
Putin described the protestors who had thronged the streets of Moscow for a few weeks 
in the previous winter in stark terms as he declared victory. He declared his victory in the 
election with great passion: 
 
We showed that our people can distinguish between the desire for renewal 
and a political provocation that has only one goal: To destroy Russian 
statehood and usurp power. 
Putin doesn’t merely dislike his would-be democratic opponents; he believes that they 
are sinister agents of foreign powers. He does not just object to the liberal political 
system they claim to support, he believes they are plotting to ‘destroy Russian statehood’, 
‘usurp power’ and hand the country over to rapacious outsiders. It would be a mistake 
to believe that this kind of talk is mere propaganda. In the past few years, as historians 
have had more access to Russian archives, it has become ever more clear that Soviet 
leaders meant what they said, even when they were using what sounded like absurdly 
ideological language. Without evidence to the contrary, it is safe to assume that Putin 
also means what he says. 
While Putin’s character and life experiences are fascinating (as is the  language he chooses 
to use), these things are only important because they facilitate a better understanding of 
the nature of the regime which he created. This is a man who held influential positions 
in the 1990s – head of the former KGB, prime minister – and who has, in practice, 
functioned as the country’s leading politician since 2000. His interpretation of the 
constitution would allow him to remain in office for eleven more years, until 2024. He 
may well have the chance to dominate Russian politics for a full quarter century. 
Some have used the expression ‘managed democracy’ when looking for a way to explain 
the system he has created. Others refer to it as ‘corporate capitalism’. The argument 
presented here is that the system is a bit of both, and that it is closely aligned to the 
culture of the 1980s KGB from which Putin emerged. As such, I will call it: ‘Putinism – 
the ideology’. 
4The word ‘ideology’ is being used here with great deliberation, as this is a carefully worked 
out system, with carefully designed institutions. It is deliberately taught to Russian children, 
promulgated to the voting public and propagated in the media. It is the basis for Russian 
foreign policy, and it comes complete with an interpretation of the past and predictions for 
the future. It even has an ostensible goal: it proposes to make Russia strong and feared again, 
and it promises to protect the power and wealth of Russia’s current ruling class. It is not 
immutable. On the contrary, it changes under the pressure of events, just as Marxist-Leninism 
once did. At the moment, it is realigning itself to cope with the fact of the new Russian 
opposition. 
What is Putinism? Clearly, its most central element, at least until now, has been the carefully 
managed electoral process, the managed political parties which take part in that process 
and the managed results. There is nothing remotely unique, or especially Russian, about 
falsified elections. Such things have also been known to happen in the most democratic of 
democracies. Nor is the phenomenon of a leader anointing his successor completely unheard 
of either. One needs to look no further than Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. 
Yet, the Russian manipulation of political outcomes has gone far deeper. Even Gordon Brown 
eventually had to face his electorate. In Russia, voters are at no stage allowed to intervene in 
the democratic process. There are no accidental victors in Russian elections – because there 
are no accidental candidates.
Instead, the semblance of choice is carefully preserved, not only through the advance choice 
of the winner, but also through the advance choice of his opponents. As they do not want 
Russia to appear to be a one-party state, the Kremlin ensures there are always several 
candidates from several parties. Some of these parties have been especially created to look 
like opponents of the status quo. The revival of the fake opposition party, a phenomenon 
familiar from communist Eastern Europe, is one of Putinism’s great contributions to modern 
political life. 
The best example is one of the most famous: Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s so-called Liberal Democrats, 
a group which routinely won parliamentary seats by sounding more nationalist and more 
extreme than the mainstream Kremlin parties, but somehow always voted with the Kremlin. 
More recently, the Kremlin has tolerated weak opponents such as the oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov, 
who was allowed to stand against Putin in recent elections, though he had no chance of success. 
The Kremlin’s genuine opponents have been marginalised, beaten up at demonstrations, 
jailed, harassed and insulted. The Other Russia, the political grouping created by former 
chess champion Garry Kasparov, was once described on the state-owned website 
Pravda.ru as a ‘motley army of deviants, criminals, wannabe politicians, fraudsters and gangsters 
on the fringes of Russian society’. More recently, following demonstrations last winter, judges 
have handed down over a jail terms to political demonstrators for plotting ‘mass unrest’. 
 
5Policemen have raided the homes of opposition leaders and lawmakers have increased 
fines for ‘illegal protests’, re-criminalised libel and expanded legal definitions of ‘treason’ 
in order to control their opponents. 
Putinism has long had ambitions beyond the mere creation of political parties. It 
also aims to create organisations that in the West are referred to as civil society or 
sometimes non-governmental organisations (CSOs and NGOs, respectively). As stated 
previously, because of their background and training, the men around Putin view all 
kinds of environmental, educational and charitable institutions not as a normal aspect 
of a functioning democracy, but as evidence of secret networks that probably involve 
Western spies. At the same time, the Kremlin has encouraged state-controlled youth 
groups, state controlled trade unions and even state controlled organisations dedicated 
to the promotion of democracy. Several years ago, I was asked by an acquaintance at 
the US embassy in Moscow to speak at a seminar on civic education for high school 
teachers, being held at something called the Institute for Democracy. After presenting 
a short speech on Western journalism, the audience began to ask aggressive questions. 
The first questioner asked ‘why America supports Chechen terrorism’. Another asked 
how a representative of the Washington Post – widely known to be a US government-
controlled newspaper and a mouthpiece of the White House - dared to speak about the 
free press. 
The audience went on, parroting an extreme version of the neo-communist propaganda 
which occasionally appears in the Russian press. Afterwards, I asked the organiser to 
explain the origins of the Institute for Democracy. It was, she replied, an older organisation 
formerly known in Soviet times as the Institute for World Peace. Though it had a new 
title, it was under the same direction, and operated according to the same principles: It 
‘taught’ students to follow whatever government line was currently in fashion. Once, 
that was international communism. Now, it’s democracy. 
The perks proffered by the Institute for Democracy – a free trip to Moscow, free meals, 
maybe a stipend – must have encouraged many of the participants, provincial high school 
teachers, to attend the seminar. But they probably made an ideological decision as well. 
They came from that part of society which believes, like Putin’s entourage that prefers the 
more orderly world of state-organised civic society to unconstrained individual liberty, and 
that non-government groups who promote democracy are, by definition, Western spies. 
The same group of people are also no doubt attracted to another, equally original element 
of Putinism, namely the managed press. In his media policy, the Russian president has, 
at least for the most part, deviated from the methods of Andropov, who simply locked 
up all of his critics. Nowadays, the system is different. Theoretically the press is free 
– up to a point. One can, for example, publish a small, independent newspaper, as long 
as it remains very small. One can function as an independent journalist, so long as one 
doesn’t publish anything that truly endangers the status quo. 
6Nevertheless, there are limits. For just as the press knows it has a certain sphere of freedom, 
it also knows that if their circulation grows too high, or reporters’ questions become too 
uncomfortable, official attitudes will change. Some years ago, when travelling in the Volgograd 
region, I encountered a young woman journalist who worked a local TV station, owned by 
the regional government (as are most local TV stations in Russia). She talked enthusiastically 
about press freedom and all of the opportunities open to young journalists. Yet, after being 
asked what would happen if she broadcast something critical of the governor, the woman 
replied: ‘They would shut us down’.
Sometimes controls are even less subtle. Novaya Gazeta, the one Moscow newspaper which 
still criticises Putin, has had its journalists beaten up, its offices broken into, its accounts 
audited again and again. Anna Politkovskaya, Novaya Gazeta’s most famous and most talented 
reporter, was murdered several years ago in the stairwell of her own apartment building in the 
middle of the day. With tactics like that, there is no need to shut many newspapers down.
The Politkovskaya case illustrates very well how Putinism works: it doesn’t eliminate all real 
political opponents, it only eliminates those who become too famous or too popular. It doesn’t 
use mass violence, instead it uses targeted violence, on the grounds that the arrest or murder 
of a single person is often enough to scare hundreds of others. Politkovskaya was allowed 
to function for many years, but was killed when her investigations brought her too close to 
the truth about Putin and the Chechen War. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the oil magnate, was 
allowed to get rich, but arrested when his money made him too independent. The women 
of Pussy Riot were allowed to stage protests, but when they began to attract real notoriety 
they were sent to labour camps. Thus, at least until recently, Putin was able to exercise greater 
control over the remaining oligarchs, the remaining journalists and the remaining protestors. 
Without Stalin-style mass arrests, would-be regime opponents are intimidated into silence 
and cooperation. No one wants to share the fate of Politkovskaya, Khodorkovsky or the Pussy 
Riot women in Siberia. 
The Putinist ideology does not operate in a vacuum. As Marx said, base determines 
superstructure, and there is no doubt about the fact that Russia’s carefully managed democracy 
is fuelled, funded and supported by a carefully managed economy. It is, and has been since 
1991, a mistake to call this system ‘capitalist’, though it possesses some apparently capitalist 
institutions, such as a stock market and banks. The resemblance is superficial. In truth, Russia 
is not a capitalist society at all. It is a rent-seeking oil economy, one which resembles Saudi 
Arabia far more than that of the United States or Western Europe.
Even as an oil economy, Russia is an original one with distinctly Putinist elements. As in Saudi 
Arabia, the nation’s largest companies and banks Gazprom, Lukoil, Rosneft – are owned by 
a small group of people. Yet these owners are not an official ruling family, like the House of 
Saud. Instead, they are a subset of Putin’s inner circle. Some of them hold double jobs, as 
government officials and captains of industry. Other magnates share their wealth with the 
7politicians in order to stay on top. Economics is politics, and vice versa, though not 
always in any transparent manner. Oligarchs can and do fall out of favour - the richest 
men in Russia today are not the same as they were ten years ago – but it isn’t always clear 
how or why. 
Since taking power, Putin has taken this system, first created by Yeltsin, and turned it in 
his favour. Although he sometimes speaks of economic ‘reform’, he is not interested in 
creating a legal system which would encourage entrepreneurship on a broad scale, or a 
banking system that would help small and medium sized enterprises grow. Instead, he 
has presided over an enormous transfer of assets, from the state and from other oligarchs 
to his friends and probably himself. The trial of Boris Berezovsky vs Roman Abramovich, 
staged in London last year, was in essence the public airing of the bitter dispute between 
a Yeltsin-era oligarch who lost much of his fortune to a Putin-era oligarch. 
Yet, if Putin and his friends have made themselves rich, if they control the print and 
television media, if they control the police and the army, why does the Russian president 
bother with the fiction of democracy? Given their wealth, power and apparent security, 
why should Putin, Medvedev and the ex-KGB men around them need all of these 
elaborate games and facades? Why did Putin hold elections at all? Why didn’t he just 
appoint himself president? Why maintain all of this pretence?
 
The answer is key to understanding the nature of this regime. Putin’s goal is to maintain 
the dominance of his clique. For some time now, the ex-KGB inner circle has believed 
that the greatest threat to this power and this money is not the West, but Western 
democracy rhetoric. Putin and Medvedev do not seriously fear western military attacks, 
but they do fear popular discontent, public questioning of their personal wealth, open 
criticism of the basic tenets of Putinism and, of course, political demonstrations of 
the sort that created the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and which followed Russian 
parliamentary elections in the winter of 2011. 
To stave these things off, they believe they must work hard to maintain their legitimacy, 
both at home and abroad. During his 2008 campaign, Medvedev did not travel around 
the country and he did not meet with supporters. Nevertheless, a campaign atmosphere 
was created: people were encouraged to vote, the media covered the election ‘story’, and 
all of the trappings of democracy were present even though there was no doubt about 
who would win. The same thing happened in 2012. Putin refused to take part in debates 
on the grounds that to do so would ‘impede his ability to duly carry out his duties’, 
in the words of his spokesman. Yet the ‘campaign’ was a matter of public discussion 
and debate. For all of his professional wariness of the real thing, Putin continues to 
adhere, in word if not in spirit, to the language and to the appearances of democracy. 
Indeed, appearances matter to him enormously – the appearance of democratic politics, 
democratic discourse and capitalist economics - and it is this which gives his regime its 
novel and deceptively powerful ideological edge. 
8The need for legitimacy had also inspired some of Putin’s harsher rhetoric about the 
West, and especially about the United States. More than once, he has accused the United 
States of encouraging the spread of weapons of mass destruction and encouraging 
terrorism. He has openly compared America to Nazi Germany. He has recently set up 
an institution designed to monitor democracy in the United States, and frequently 
accuses both Americans and Western Europeans, especially the British, of hypocrisy 
and human rights violations. This rhetoric serves several purposes, but above all it is 
designed to inoculate the Russian public against the example of more open societies. 
Underlining this rhetoric is a Putinist interpretation of history. Famously, the ex-Russian president 
once described the breakup of the Soviet Union as ‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of 
the 20th century’. He has also displayed Soviet flags in anniversary parades, and brought a 
‘neutral’ version of the history of Stalinism to Russian textbooks. More importantly, Putin has 
spent the past decade trying to promulgate an alternate post-Soviet history. In his version, 
1989 was not a moment of liberation, but the beginning of economic collapse. The hardships 
and deprivations which Russians experienced during the 1990s were not the result of decades 
of communist neglect and widespread theft but of Western-style capitalism and democracy. 
Communism was stable and safe; post-communism has been a disaster. The Soviet Union 
was great; Russia was, until Putin’s arrival, a failure. The Soviet empire, launched in 1945, 
was a moment of triumph to be remembered proudly, and the blood and terror required to 
achieve it are forgotten. The more people believe all of this, the less likely they are to want a 
system which is more genuinely democratic and genuinely capitalist. The more nostalgia for 
Soviet-era symbols – especially imperial symbols from the year 1945 - the more secure the 
KGB clique is going to be. 
This context makes Putin’s harsher verbal attacks on some of Russia’s neighbours easier to 
understand. In the past, his most vitriolic rhetoric has been reserved for those countries 
which have most successfully navigated the path from communism to democracy, and which 
maintain the most open and pro-Western political systems: Poland, Estonia, Georgia and, at 
least until its most recent elections, Ukraine. It is highly improbable, for example, that Putin 
actually feared the missile defence shield that President Bush wanted to place in Poland, 
and impossible to believe that he was truly intimidated by NATO’s relationship with Georgia. 
But he is afraid of the example set by these countries, since they challenge his own country’s 
geopolitical choices, and American support for them infuriates him. 
Russia’s foreign policy towards the post-Arab-spring Middle East is also dictated, in part, by 
concerns for legitimacy at home. Russia’s behaviour Syria is in this sense highly ideological. 
Although Russian diplomats are openly contemptuous of Assad, and although Russian 
economic interests in Syria are in fact very narrow, the Russian government, in the wake of 
the successful Libyan revolution, does not want to see another authoritarian state toppled 
by a popular opposition. It’s too close to home. Nor does it want to see another ‘victory’ for 
the Western democracies, or for what might be broadly understood as a Western political 
movement. That undermines its own authority. 
9Russia is not alone in fearing the democratic example of the West, and in preferring, 
therefore, to see authoritarian regimes around the world succeed. Although a lot of 
guff is spoken about Russia’s lack of ‘soft power’, Putinism does have a great deal of 
appeal as an economic and political model, especially in Central Asia – Uzbekistan, 
Tajikstan, Kazakhstan – but also in Iran, in Venezuela and elsewhere. The Iranian 
president, Ahmedinijad, took a leaf out of Putin’s book a few years ago when he held an 
academic conference in Tehran to discuss the Holocaust, and invited a number of famous 
Holocaust deniers. He declared the conference ‘an opportunity for thinkers who cannot 
express their views freely in Europe about the Holocaust’. If the West is going to shelter 
Iranian dissidents, in other words, then Iran will shelter David Irving and David Duke, just 
as Russia will sponsor investigations of democratic practices in the United States. 
Putinist politicians and businessmen have also tried, with notable success, to gain influence 
abroad through the spread of Putinist-style corruption. Often they do so with the help 
of Russian oil and gas companies. At the moment Russia’s Lukoil controls refineries in 
Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania, and has assets in Greece and the former Yugoslavia. 
Gazprom now owns the Serbian national oil company - openly purchased with an eye 
to the influence it would bring - as well as a third of the Portuguese gas company Galp 
Energia. It has close ties with the Austrian energy giant OMV, and a strong relationship 
with Ruhrgas in Germany. These are not purely economic relationships. In every single 
country where they have invested, the Russian oil and gas oligarchs have not only lobbied 
for financial and banking regulations which will be favourable to their interests, both 
offshore and in Russia, but have also  used their money to influence foreign politicians. 
Famously, even a German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, was induced to go and work 
for Gazprom immediately upon leaving office. 
This is how Putinism attempts to preserve itself at home, promote itself abroad, and 
protect the wealth and power of its leaders. And yet, the ultimate test of an ideology 
is not whether it can work for a brief period of time, but where it can last. First years 
ago, one could have argued that it absolutely can. With energy prices still rising, and the 
media monopoly firmly in place, there seemed no reason to doubt it. 
However, the events of the past eighteen months have raised questions about the 
durability of Putinism. In recent years, the building blocks of Putinism have begun to look 
weaker. Clearly the growth of the internet has helped to undermine Putin’s monopoly 
on the media. Partly as a result, the ‘managed elections’ once accepted by Russians 
without apparent comment, have sparked a series of open protests. It is harder to fool 
this generation of Russians, or at least harder to get them to roll their eyes and ignore 
obviously falsified elections. At the same time, Putin’s fake political party and his fake 
civil society organisations have more recently attracted opprobrium rather than new 
members, as they are associated with official corruption. As a result of these changes, 
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a new Russian opposition has emerged. Unlike its predecessors, its rhetoric and energy are 
focused not on ideas about human rights, but on corruption, government theft and the lack 
of transparency in the government and the economy – precisely the things which Putinism 
depends upon to survive. 
Meanwhile, the implicit promise of Putinism – the offer of stability and a slowly rising standard 
of living in exchange for the freedom to rule – has been eroded by much slower growth in 
parts of the country. A major drop in oil prices would accelerate this process, because it would 
deprive the Russian state budget of most of its revenues. If the dramatic fall in gas prices in 
the United States heralds a real change in Europe, some of Russia’s ability to influence the 
political views of its neighbours might change as well. Certainly the uptick in violence, the 
harsher legal methods and the extremely harsh language Putin has used in recent months 
against the new political opposition indicate that he, too, is worried: ‘managed democracy’ 
was supposed to keep these kinds of movements weak and fragmented. 
What can be done to help this new opposition? Frankly, not much – our ability to alter the 
course of internal events in Russia is and always has been limited. Still, the fact that we have 
very little influence on the future of Putinism doesn’t mean that we have to go along with 
its central tenet: we do not have to pretend, as the Russian political elite does, that Russia 
is a democracy, or that Russia is a ‘normal’ member of the international community. We do 
not have to accept its descriptions of NGOs as foreign agents. We do not even have to allow 
Russia to remain a member of the G-8, historically a club for rich democracies. Originally, 
Russia was allowed to attend its meetings on the muddled theory that this would help Russia 
become a democracy. It did not. Why not end the pretence? The point here is that our 
standards should remain our standards, and our language should remain uncorrupted. 
But even if we can’t do much, the Russians can do a great deal, and I hope we don’t make the 
mistake of underestimating them. The past twenty years have showed that in Eastern Europe, 
no country is incapable of change. Sooner or later, the generation trained in the mindset of 
Andropov’s KGB will retire. Sooner or later, younger Russians will draw lessons not from the 
experience of the 1990s, but from the experience of the 2000s. There is no guarantee this 
new generation will be better, but it will be different. Perhaps, in this context, we should all 
remember the words of an ancient Slavic proverb: ‘where there is death, there is hope’. ■
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